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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

WEST UNION CANAL COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case
No. 7190

vs.
PROVO BENCH CANAL AND

IR~

RIGATION COMPANY, a corporation, et al,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT
(Numbers in parentheses, preceded by "JR", refer to
pages in Judgment Roll file; plain numbers in parentheses
refer to pages in Transcript.)

STATEMENT

The statements of facts given by appellant are not considered by respondent to accurately present the evidence
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upon which the trial court acted and the questions posed
do not present the questions which this. Court must decide
in this case.
The evidence showed that the Provo Bench Canal &
Irrigation Company owned the laterals and had incorpora-·
ted them into its system. (336-337). Any stockholder of
the company who wanted his water delivered through the
Southeast Ditch asked the secretary of the company to
place it there for him, and the secretary was the only person who could do it. (342). The amount of the- water delivered to each ditch was~ determined by the Provo Bench
officers. (330-332). The list of stockholders receiving water through the ditch or lateral was then submitted to the
secretary of the ditch and the only organziation of users
on the lateral was for the purpose of dividing the water
furnished by the company into equal shares of time according to the amount of stock certified to it by the secretary
of the company. (118-119). All stockholders had not been
notified of the time of their turn. (105). The superintendent of the Provo Bench company testified as follows:
"Well, I try and size up how much rainfall there is, and try
and -determine, I mean in my own mind, how much water
'tti.e people on Provo Bench need, and I regulate the flow of
the canal accordingly." (359) . He did not advise anyone
when he turned the water out of the canal. (361).
The Southeast Ditch, a lateral of the Provo Bench
Company, ended at the Christenson property and a ditch
continued to the road, above the bridge, where the water
washed into the respondent's canal. (124). About 11:00
o'clock of the evening before the washout, water was flowing across the road just above the bridge w'hich crossed the
respondent's canal at 20th South and Main Streets, Orem.
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It was enough that the witness stopped his car before crossing. (8). It was still flowing about 6 o'clock the next morning. (262). Mr. Jensen testified: "Right at the bridge
where this gravel had coursed from the road there was a
big pile, there, practically blocked the canal, and we walked
down the canal I should judge a hundred feet and kicked
into the ne\V fill that had been carried down by the stream
of water~ and it was approximately six inches deep at that
point.'' (180). The road was washed out and practically
impassable for from 20 to 25 rods and it took from 30 to
60 cubic yards of fill to level the road. (21, 389) . There
was no evidence of any rain water running down the street.
(26). Mr. Schemensky, who had lived near there for 30
years had never seen any run-off as the result of rain.
(132). Before the washing out of the road it had been covered at the side by hay and trash, but after the washout
the trash was no longer there. (184).
The respondent's canal had been. cleaned· that spring
for its entire length. (46) . About a half mile belo\v the
bridge where the washing into the canal occurred a pipe
in the canal was washed out. (39). Just above the intake
_to this pipe was a screen to catch debris coming down the
canal. The watermaster had checked it the night before
and there was a little trash on it. The next morning it was
filled right up. When the trash on the screen became heavy, as on the morning of the washout, the trash would flow
over. (243). See also plaintiff's Exhibit "F", a picture taken the day after the washout. Mr. Zobell, the secretary
of the West Union, had also checked the screen the night
before and it was then clear. (140). The pipe at the intake
could run 35 second feet of water. (21~). On May 5, 1946,
the canal had carried 41.2 second feet of water at the head
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and there was about 25 second feet going to the pipe and
it was taking it well there. (247-248). On the night in question there was 30 second feet coming into the canal and below the Davis corner there would be 18 second feet. (241).
It is respondent's theory, and the court adopted it, that,
where the canal had successfully carried and was able to
carry more water than the West Union had in it at the
time of the break, and water from the lateral of the Provo
Bench had washed out a road, carrying down a large
amount of dirt and gravel, together with trash, along the
road, such trash and extra water were the causes of the
break.
To clear the canal below the break and to scrape a way
for the new section of the canal took 70 hours with a bulldozer, at the reasonable price of $6.00 per hour. (188). The
cost of the pipe which was washed out was $235.00, and
had taken three men two days to put in. (172-173). The
cleaning of the ditch at the bridge took two men and a team
two days, and the reasonable cost of such work was from
$10.00 to $12.00 for the man and team per day and $1.00
per hour for the extra man. (181-183). To GOnstruct a new
canal in the place available for such canal cost $1674.61.
(203). The Court found a total damage of $699.25.
Additional statements of fact will be ·adverted to in the
argument.

ARGUMENT
The arguments in appellant's brief are grouped in four
divisions, and respondent's brief will generally follow this
division.
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I.
THE SOUTHEAST DITCH WAS A LATERAL
OWNED BY AND UNDER TilE CONTRO~L OF APPELLANT.
Appellant objects to the finding that the Southeast
Ditch was a ditch of respondent's. The evidence shows that
the appellant owned this lateral and had incorporated it into the company. (336). The only person who had authority to change water stock from one lateral to another was
the secretary of respondent. (342). The amount of water
delivered to each lateral was determined by the officers of
respondent. (330-332). The list of stockholders whose water was turned into the lateral was then submitted to the
secretary of the lateral and his only authority was to divide the time in accordance with the list. (118-119). The
superintendent of appellant testified: "Well, I try and size
up how much rainfall there is, and try to determine, I mean
in my own mind, how much water the people on Provo
Bench need, and I regulate the flow of the canal accordingly." (359). He did not advise anyone when he turned the
water out of the canal. (361). This evidence is practically
uncontradicted, and would seem sufficient evidence upon
which to base the finding. There is no evidence of anyone
else being the owner of this Iateral.
Appellant argues that it has no duty to see that a way
is provided to care for unused water. The recent case of
Briant vs. Fremont Irrigation Co., 86 Pac. 2d 588,,_·_ _
Utah
, at page 590 states:
"(2, 3) Utah is one of the arid states and the conservation of water is of the utmost importance to· the
public welfare. To waste water is to injure that welSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fare, and it is therefore the duty of the user of water
to return the surplus or waste water into the stream
from which it was taken so that further use can be
made by others. See Kinney on Irrigation and Water
Rights, 2d_ Ed., Sec. 812, pages 1614-1616. Furthermore, the natural channel serves as the natural drainage for the waters in the area. Appellant's allegation
therefore that respondent returned and allowed others
to return waste water to its natural channel, could not,
in the absence of an allegation of negligence in the
manner of so returning the water, entitle him to any
redress against respondent for doing that which it
should do."
See also Salt River Valley Water ·Users' Assn. vs. Stewart, 34 Pac. 2d (Ariz.) 400; Billings Realty Co. vs. Big Ditch
Co., 115 Pac. (Mont.) 828.
A general demurrer was interposed to the amended
complaint. In the complaint it is alleged that the .appellant
failed to provide for excess and unused water, knowing
that it was not cared for and a potential danger, and also
that respondent failed to notify users of water of their
turns and that these acts of negligence were causes of the
damages alleged. 'V-Ie submit that these are acts of negligence and certainly good against a general demurrer.
All users on the night of the washout had not been
notified that it was their turn to water. (105). The Southeast Ditch is continued to the road above the bridge where
the water washed into respondent's canal. (124). During
that night the periods for irrigation turns, as shown by
plaintiff's Exhibit "G," varied from seven minutes to about
three hours, with a total of 13 irrigators in less than 12
hours and two of those had over half the time. The probability of an irrigator with seven minutes turn getting up
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in the middle of the night in a rain to take a turn of that
length is small. The appellant has furnished the water to
these stockholders knowing these things, and now wants
to put the loss on respondent, which could do nothing
about it. It is submitted that, as the cases say, the appellant did have an obligation to see that a way was provided
for waste and unused water to get back to the natural
channel or be safely taken care of in some other manner.
Appellant is surely not contending that the respondent
must maintain such a canal that it will take care of all
the \Vater the appellant can tum into the road above its
canal.
It may be that the system was adequate when the
users were large users with crops that required water each
irrigation turn, but with turns for part shares, with small
plots and short turns, it is not now adequate to control the
water. We submit that this is the problem of appellant, and
cannot be pushed on respondent.
II.

APPELLANT OWES A DUTY TO CARE FOR
\VASTE OR .UNUSED WATER.
Appellant objects to the finding of fact No. 4, in which
it was found that the Southeast Ditch Company is an association of stockholders for the convenience of the Provo
Bench Canal & Irrigation Company. The only evidence on
this was that the only purpose of .the organization of the
stockholders was to divide the time among the stockholders in accordance with the list of shares of stock submitted
to them by the secretary of respondent. (118-119). From
this it \vould seem to be only an organization to save the
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secretary of respondent the job of figuring out the time
for each turn. It had no part in the control of the lateral.
There is no dispute in the evidence that all the stockholders had not received the notice of their turns. The
list, plaintiff's Exhibit "G", was made up from the slips
not delivered the day after the washout. (105). The water
had been turned into the canal and laterals of appellant,
and some water had probably been in the canal and laterals- all winter. To turn down a full supply without seeing
to it that the users were notified that the time for regular
turns had begun is not the act of one who is careful. We
believe that appellant was under duty to see that such notice was given. They had been notified that there was danger at the exact point where the damage occurred. (59-60).
To say that the company can put water in its own ditches
without notifying the users that their turns have started,
and without a place for the unused or excess water to go,
does and should constitute negligence.
Appellant argues that it would be impossible for it to
control the water to the end of the laterals. Had it been
distributed over the land of the stockholders near the end
of the ditch there would have been no damage. If the company had someone who would care for the water and see
that it did not go into this particular cii'tch unlss it could'
be used, there would have been no damage. As between appellant and respondent, there would seem to be no question
of whose liability it should be.
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III.

NEGLIGENCE OF APPELLANT PLEADED AND
PROVED.
Appel~ant

argues that there is no allegation of negligence or proof of negligence. As has been stated, the complaint did allege the negligence of appellant in failing to
care for the waste or unused water in the ditch. It \Vas also alleged that appellant had failed to notify the stockholders of the times of their turns. The evidence heretofore
referred to shows such to be the case. A general demurrer was interposed to the amended complaint, and in its
construction respondent is entitled to all that it fairly alleges. If appellant wanted a n1ore detailed statement of
in what way it had failed to provide for care of waste water, it should have been demanded by special demurrer.
It is not contended that the appellant is an insurer,
but with -notice of damage being done, and more probable,
certainly an irrigation company cannot say it has no duty
to see that unused or waste water in its ditch is so disposed
that it does not _injure other parties.
We submit that under the authorities cited above it
is the duty of the appellant to see that such water is cared
for.
Appellant argues that there is no evidence that the
stockholders did not use their water during the night in
question. There can be no question but that water in quantity flowed from the end of the ditch on the road and into
the canal of respondent. From the very situation of the
irrigation ditch, watering land on both sides (125) the ditch
could not accumulate rain water.
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There was enough water in the ditch and flowing out
at the end of it to wash a road for a distance of 20 to 25
rods, making it impassable. (21). It washed enough into
the respondent's canal to block the canal where it went in,
and at a hundred feet from that point was 6 inches deep.
(180). Probably the amount of the water, in and of itself,
would not have done the damage, but with the debris that
was picked up along the way, the extra water did cause the
damage complained of by the respondent.
On May 5th the respondent's canal had carried 41.2
second feet at the head and 25 second feet at the pipe. (247248) . On the night in question there was 30 second feet
at the head and 18 second feet at the pipe. (241). The canal had been cleaned shortly before. (46) . The screen at
the intake to the pipe had been checked the night before
and found practically clean. The next morning it was filled
right up. (243) . The intake to the pipe would take care
of 35 second feet of water. (214) . HJow can appellant say
there is no evidence that this extra water and debris was
not responsible? It is much more reasonable, under such
facts, to assume that the debris and extra water were the
responsible agents.
The pipe or flume washed out had been placed in an
iron half pipe that had been there for several years, and
the dirt under it had been pushed in by a bulldozer and
tamped. (176) .
Plaintiff's Exhibit "F" is a picture of the screen to
catch the deb liS about 75 feet above the intake to this pipe.
This picture was taken the day after the washout. (40).
A glance at it will show that the water had raised the de·
bris high enough to flow around the screen, and undoubt·
edly this is what had happened and caused the break and
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washout. With the amount of \Vater in the West Union
Canal, less than had successfully been used previously,
such a conclusion-that the debris caused the stoppage of
the pipe-seems \Veil justified.
There was no substantial amotmt of flood water on
that night. Mr. Dawson, the president of the respondent
company, testified that the wash from the State Road did
not lead into the canal at that time (69) and that the wash
from the State Rload later in the year was caused by irrigation water. (70). Mr. Schemensky, who had resided in
that neighborhood for 30 years, testified that he had never
seen surplus rain \Vater flowing down the road above the
bridge where the washin occurred. (13). Mr. Gappmayer
testified that there was no evidence of any washing above
where the ditch came to the road, and that the ground
would take a lot of water. (207).
The trial court was able to see the witnesses when they
testified, and to judge of their credibility, and. his findings
have much evidence to support them.

IV.

NEGLIGENCE OF APPELLANT CAUSE OF DAMAGE TO RESPONDENT.
Appellant contends that there is no evidence to connect it with the damages to the canal of respondent. It
has been set forth previously that the Southeast-Ditch was
a ditch of appellant's, who did what supervising was done
on it; that the water came out of this ditch and washed the
rocks, dirt and debris from the road into respondent's canal; that this canal had previously handled more water
than was in the canal on the night in question; that the
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screen just above the intake to the pipe was clear the night
before the washout and was covered over the next morning.
The plaintiff's Exhibit "F" shows that the sticks and straw
had been washed around this scren. This picture was taken the day after the washout. No one saw the water go
over the screen and the debris sticking at the mouth of the
pipe, ·but there is plenty of evidence on which to base such
a conclusion.
Appellant cites the evidence of Mr. Davis. He never
went above the bridge and never said he looked to see if
the canal had been washed full of rocks. He heard the
rocks rolling down during the night and no one saw them
below the bridge the next day. Mr. Ervil Davis stopped
his car at about 11 o'clock the night before, because the
water was washing across the road about 40 feet above
the bridge. (8).
Appellant claims the West ·Up.ion Canal had broken
its banks at other times when it was raining. The time referred to was caused by water from Roy Gappmayer's farm,
which put a bar of gravel in the ditch. (175).
Mr. Frank Wentz testified that the water from the river at the intake to the canal could nof change much. (387).
The official records show 30 second feet at the intake.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit "I'', page 77). Appellant's Southeast
Ditch circled the hill above where the respondent's canal
is located, and the Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Company did not report any other wash into respondent's canal. (103-104).
This is a case where the trial judge determines the
fact, and if there is evidence to sustain his judgment, this
Court will not reverse it. We submit that there is not only
sufficient evidence to sustain the judgment, but that the
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clear preponderance of the evidence sustains it. There is
no other reasonable conclusion that can be reached on the
evidence submitted.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the appellant has not sustained the burden of showing that no
substantial evidence was introduced upon which the findings could be based. In fact, it was by picking out only unusually favorable pieces of evidence that the matter could
be presented favorably to its contention.
We believe that an irrigation company has some duty
other than merely bringing the water for irrigation out of
a river and then turning it loose without notice, and without a sufficient ditGh to care for it. We believe that this is
especially true where they have been notified that damages
have resulted before and indications are that further damage would be caused by them.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs to respondent.
Respectfully submitted,

J.C.HALBERSLEBEN,
Attorney for Respondent
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